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Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do 
not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness 
preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters 
are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We 
experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and 
show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is 
more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we 
find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated 
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Mounting evidence suggests that people have heterogeneous preferences for fair distribution 
(e.g. Bellemare, Kröger and van Soest 2008, see Camerer 2003 for a survey). For example, 
Alesina and Giuliano (2009:1) note that “individuals have views regarding redistribution that 
go beyond the current and future states of their pocketbooks. These views reflect different 
ideas about what an appropriate shape of the income distribution is: in practice, views about 
acceptable levels of inequality”.
2
This paper shows experimentally that the effect of a given share of fair-minded voters on 
redistribution outcomes depends on the structure of income classes, in particular on which 
class is in majority and on the relative size of the classes. By virtue of random allocation of 
subjects to treatments, we control that the distribution of voters with a concern for fairness is 
the same in all of our treatments. By virtue of experimental control over material payoffs, we 
control the “pocketbook interest” of voters, i.e. the redistribution level that maximizes a 
voter’s income. We then vary structural parameters (i.e. which class is in majority) to identify 
the causal effect of class structure on redistribution outcomes. We show that the discrepancy 
between observed and predicted, according to pocketbook  interests, redistribution is 
asymmetric in majority voting. The discrepancy tends to be pronounced if few fair-minded 
voters suffice to tip the balance, but essentially no discrepancy occurs when many are needed.  
 While much research has investigated the effects of social 
preferences on bargaining, labor markets and contracting (e.g. Cabrales et al. 2010; Charness 
and Kuhn 2010, Fehr, Goette and Zehnder 2009), economists have devoted surprisingly little 
attention to the question of  how such fairness preferences may affect democratic 
redistribution (see e.g. Dhami and Al-Nowaihi 2010 and Galasso 2003 for theoretical work). 
This lack of attention may be driven by the apparently plausible intuition that the extent to 
which fairness concerns induce redistribution simply depends on how pronounced “views 
about acceptable levels of inequality” are in a given population. In this paper, we show that 
this intuition is misleading and that structural factors are relevant too.  
We demonstrate this asymmetric effect of preferences  for a fair distribution on 
redistribution outcomes in a laboratory experiment with two income classes, which we call 
the “rich” and the “poor”  for convenience.  Participants  decide on a one-dimensional 
redistribution parameter (which can be thought of as a compound of a tax and per capita 
                                                 
2  This fact has been recognized by many scholars in the field. For example, Downs (1957: 27) noted: “In reality, 
men are not always selfish, even in politics. They frequently do what appears to be individually irrational 
because they believe it is socially rational – i.e., it benefits others even though it harms them personally.” 3 
 
redistribution of tax revenues) in a majority vote. Parameters are such that the pocketbook 
interests of the “rich” are for low, and those of the “poor” for intermediate redistribution. The 
poor prefer intermediate rather than extreme redistribution  because higher redistribution 
levels reduce efficiency (as in e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981). Thus, the median-voter model 
with strictly self-interested voters predicts low redistribution if the rich are in majority but 
intermediate redistribution if the poor are in majority.  
Now suppose that some voters have a preference for a fair distribution, i.e. suppose that 
some voters are “inequality averse” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). 
Such fair-minded voters demand more redistribution than otherwise identical, purely self-
interested voters. To illustrate the asymmetry effect, assume that the rich and the poor are 
equally concerned with fairness. If the rich are a narrow majority, i.e. they are the median 
class, few fair-minded rich suffice to tip the balance and a fair-minded rich voter is likely to 
be pivotal. If the poor are in majority, (moderately) fair-minded rich cannot move the median 
position, and many fair-minded poor voters are required to move the median position beyond 
the pocketbook interest of the poor. Thus, fair-minded voters are unlikely to be pivotal in this 
case. In summary, the probability that a fair-minded voter is pivotal depends on the class 
structure in majority voting. The probability is high when the median class demands relatively 
low levels of redistribution and when it is a small majority (we show in appendix B that the 
asymmetry result extends to a continuum of voters and any finite number of income classes).  
Our experimental design tests how the asymmetric effect of inequality aversion depends 
on the class structure in two ways. First, we test if the asymmetry is present when we expect it 
to be present. We compare redistribution outcomes in majority voting when the rich are in 
majority vs. when the poor are in majority, holding everything else constant. In line with the 
asymmetry hypothesis, we observe redistribution beyond the pocketbook interest of the rich 
when they are in majority but we do not observe redistribution beyond the pocketbook interest 
of the poor when the poor are in majority. Second, we test if the asymmetry is absent when 
we expect it to be absent. We implement control treatments with the same class structure as in 
the main treatments, but in which the probability to be pivotal does not depend on the class 
structure by design. In these “random dictator” treatments the probability to be pivotal is 
exogenous and the same for all voters, independent of whether they are rich or poor. In line 
with the asymmetry hypothesis, we observe that the deviation from pocketbook outcomes is 
not different for a rich or a poor majority.  4 
 
Our findings are remarkable on three accounts. First, we identify structural conditions 
under which (by virtue of randomization) given preferences for fair distribution matter much 
and, perhaps more surprisingly, when they matter little. This is, to the best of our knowledge, 
a novel demonstration of the well-known phenomenon that the aggregate outcome may look 
as if all  individuals  were  rational and self-interested  when, in fact, deviations from this 
reference case are common at the individual level (see Fehr and Tyran 2005 for a general 
discussion). For example, we find that when the poor outnumber the rich in majority voting, 
only about 30% of the rich vote in line with their pocketbook interest. However, these rich 
voters are unlikely to be pivotal because about 80% of poor voters vote in line with their 
pocketbook. In other words, the standard prediction is robust to the rather pronounced 
deviation from pocketbook voting by rich voters because they are not pivotal in this case.  
Second, the asymmetry hypothesis seems to militate against the intuition that “spite is 
stronger than generosity”. While considerable experimental  evidence  in support of that 
intuition exists in a wide range of contexts (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999), the asymmetry 
hypothesis suggests that “generosity” (the tendency of the rich to vote for increasing the 
payoffs of the poor beyond what is in their self-interest) has more bite than “spite” (the 
tendency of the poor to vote for reducing the payoffs of the rich beyond what is in their self-
interest) in majority voting.  
Third,  while the asymmetry effect is in some sense a purely “mechanical” effect 
mapping individual preferences into majority voting outcomes, it is perhaps surprising that it 
is observed at the aggregate level because of a possible countervailing effect resulting from 
insincere voting. If voters anticipate the asymmetry effect, they expect to be pivotal with high 
probability in some cases but expect to be largely irrelevant for the outcome in other cases. 
Deviations from pocketbook voting are less costly when a voter is unlikely to be pivotal, and 
it seems plausible that such deviations are more likely in this case. We indeed find some 
evidence of insincere voting. For example, when the rich are in majority (RMV), we find that 
the rich vote much more in line with their pocketbook interest (about 60% vs. 30% when they 
are minority). Despite the fact that in RMV many (60%) rich voters do vote their pocketbook, 
we  observe  frequent deviations  from pocketbook predictions in redistribution outcomes 
because inequality-averse rich voters are likely to be pivotal in this case.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the 
experimental design and explains how the pivotality of inequality-averse voters depends on 5 
 
the structure of income classes in the context of our design (appendix B explains how the 
logic extends to a continuum of voters and more than two income classes). Section 4 presents 
results, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Our paper adds to a relatively slim experimental literature on the role of social preferences in 
voting on redistribution. Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2004) show that inequality 
aversion induces approval for redistributive (progressive) taxes among voters who do not 
benefit from redistribution when taxes are not distorting but find that voting is mainly in line 
with self-interested voting in the presence of a trade-off between fairness and equality, a result 
according well with Engelmann and Strobel (2004). However, Bolton and Ockenfels (2003) 
study the trade-off between fairness and efficiency in voting and find that voters are about 
twice as likely to vote against their pocketbook interest in favor of a more fair compared to a 
more efficient allocation. Durante and Putterman (2009)  investigate how self-interest vs. 
social preferences shape  voting on redistributive taxes both when voters are and are not 
affected by the outcome (i.e. are in the role of an impartial spectator) and show that voters are 
willing to redistribute, in particular when the cost of doing so is low. These results resonate 
well with Beckman et al. (2002) who find that voters are willing to accept relatively large 
efficiency losses when income positions are not known but support for fair redistribution 
dwindles when voters know their position and are asked to contribute. Klor and Shayo (2010) 
show that “social identity”, i.e. belonging to a distinct social group may affect voting on 
redistribution. Grosser and Reuben (2009) study voting on redistribution of incomes earned in 
a competitive market and observe support for income-equalizing redistribution, in line with 
equilibrium predictions assuming pocketbook voting.
3
Several experimental papers have investigated how variation in pivot probabilities may 
induce voters to cast votes that deviate from their material self-interest. A prominent idea is 
 
                                                 
3  Note that we use the expression “pocketbook voting” in the sense of voting in line with one’s material self-
interest. Because the material consequences of a particular policy can rarely be predicted with certainty in the 
wild, the expression “pocketbook voting” is often used in field studies to mean retrospective voting in which 
voters punish the incumbent if personal or household financial conditions have deteriorated. In contrast, we 
use the term “pocketbook voting” in the sense of voting in line with material self-interest. This is possible in 
our study by virtue of experimental control. In our experiment, the properties and consequences of alternative 
redistribution outcomes are known with certainty to voters. A vast literature investigates “economic voting” 
using field data. According to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) there are about 400 published studies, and 
the cumulative support for this kind of “pocketbook voting” is marginal at best. 6 
 
that voters may use their votes to express moral views rather than to instrumentally affect the 
redistribution outcome if they believe that their vote is unlikely to matter for the redistribution 
outcome (e.g. Eichenberger and Oberholzer 1998, Tyran 2004,  Shayo and Harel 2011, 
Kamenica and Egan 2011). Feddersen, Gailmard and Sandroni (2009) experimentally study 
moral bias due to expressive voting in large elections. These authors also provide an excellent 
survey of the literature which tends to find mixed results.  
A close match to our paper is Tyran and Sausgruber (TS, 2006) who have first noted the 
asymmetry property (their result 1). Our experimental design differs in several ways from TS. 
TS study voting on one exogenously proposed redistribution proposal while we allow the 
redistribution level to be endogenously determined. TS study zero-sum (i.e. costless) 
redistribution while our design implements a trade-off between efficiency and equality. While 
TS have mainly focused on the case where “a little fairness may induce a lot of 
redistribution”, we emphasize both aspects of the asymmetry, including the case where the 
redistribution outcomes are unlikely to be affected despite a considerable concern for fair 
distribution in the electorate. While TS were unable to directly test for the asymmetry effect 
(they only had one treatment), we test for the asymmetry to arise in two treatments with 
majority voting, and provide structurally identical control treatments with random dictator 
voting designed to eliminate it.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
In all treatments, N = 5 voters are allocated to two income classes with R “rich” and P “poor” 
voters (N = R + P). Voters are homogenous within a class. The pocketbook interests of the 
rich are for low redistribution, the pocketbook interests of the poor are, because of a built-in 
trade-off between equality and efficiency explained below, for moderate redistribution. In 
each period, each voter  simultaneously chooses  a redistribution level ri. Voting is 
compulsory.
4
                                                 
4   Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2010) show experimentally that participation in referenda is systematically 
affected by pivotality considerations in a framework with differently informed voters.  
  Our experimental design has 4 treatments. In the 2 main treatments, the 
redistribution outcome is determined by majority voting, i.e. by the decision of the median 
voter. In 2 otherwise identical control treatments, the outcome is determined by the random 
dictator procedure, i.e. by a randomly chosen voter. The level chosen by the decisive voter is 
implemented for all voters. At the end of each period, all voters are informed about the choice 7 
 
of the decisive voter and the resulting income distribution but not about the distribution votes, 
and a new period begins. We use a partner design, i.e. group composition is constant for all T 
= 15 periods. 
In the two main treatments the redistribution outcome is determined by majority voting, 
and the treatments exclusively differ by which income class is in majority. In treatment RMV, 
the rich are in majority (R = 3, P = 2), while the poor are in majority (R = 2, P = 3) in 
treatment PMV.  The two treatments with random dictator procedure are identical to the 
respective treatments with majority voting in all respects (e.g. payoffs, class structure) except 
for how redistribution outcomes are determined from individual votes. While in RMV and in 
PMV the median voter determines the outcome, redistribution levels are determined by a 
random draw from individual choices in treatments RMRD and PMRD.  
Whether a voter is pivotal in majority voting is endogenous, i.e. depends on how others 
vote, and is not known to voters ex ante. According to the asymmetry hypothesis, inequality 
aversion has asymmetric effects on redistribution outcomes in majority voting across 
treatments  because inequality-averse  rich  voters  are  more likely to induce redistribution 
outcomes beyond the pocketbook prediction when the rich are in majority (in RMV) than 
when the poor are in majority (in PMV). In the treatments with the random dictator procedure, 
we control the probability to be pivotal. In these treatments, the probability of being pivotal is 
1/N for each voter and the effect of inequality aversion on redistribution outcomes is predicted 
to be independent of the treatment.  
Properties of the asymmetry effect  
Figure 1 illustrates the basic intuition of the asymmetry effect in majority voting on 
redistribution for 5 voters in 2 income classes (see appendix B for the case of a continuum of 
voters in k classes). The vertical axis shows the redistribution level r and the horizontal axis 
ranks the voters by income class. The squares represent the ideal positions of rich voters, the 
triangles the ideal positions of poor voters. For example, panel 1 shows a case with 3 identical 
rich (self-interested) voters who have ideal points at rR* and 2 (self-interested) poor voters 
with ideal points at rP*. The panels on the left illustrate outcomes for rich majorities (RMV), 
the panels on the right for poor majorities (PMV). The upper panels show cases with self-
interested voters, the lower panels cases where some voters are inequality averse. 
Pocketbook voting by all voters (see upper panels) predicts dramatically different 
redistribution outcomes in RMV and PMV. If all voters cast their votes according to the 8 
 
pocketbook, the median voter is rich in RMV and low redistribution at  rm  =  rR*  is the 
predicted outcome  (see  panel 1). In contrast, the median voter is poor  in PMV, and an 
intermediate level of redistribution at rm = rP* is the predicted outcome (see panel 2).  
The lower panels in figure 1 illustrate outcomes when some voters are inequality averse. 
Panel 3 illustrates the outcome in RMV where one rich voter is inequality averse and casts a 
vote  ri  >  rR*  while all others vote according to the pocketbook. In this case, inequality 
aversion does affect the redistribution outcome (rm > rR*). Panel 4 illustrates the case with a 
poor majority (PMV) where one poor voter and one rich voter is inequality-averse but the 
redistribution outcome is not affected by inequality aversion and the same outcome prevails in 
PMV as when no voter is inequality averse (rm = rP*).  
 
Figure 1:   Redistribution outcomes in majority voting for a rich majority (left panels) and 
poor majority (right panels), without (top) and with (bottom) inequality aversion 
(N = 5) 
 9 
 
The asymmetry in redistribution outcomes prevails in the example above because with a 
narrow rich majority, the most inequality-averse rich voter drives the outcome (panel 3) but 
with a narrow poor majority, the least inequality-averse poor voter drives the outcome (panel 
4). Thus, a little inequality aversion goes a long a way in RMV (this is the intuition discussed 
in Tyran and Sausgruber 2006), but is irrelevant in PMV. 
 
Table 1:   Probability of obtaining redistribution outcomes in line with standard theory 
(“pocketbook” prediction) with inequality-averse voters (ρ = 0.2)  



















1    -  0.96    0.97    0.98    0.99 
2    0.64  -  0.99    0.99    1.00   
3      0.51  -  1.00    1.00    1.00 
4    0.82    0.41  -  1.00    1.00   
5      0.66    0.33  -  1.00    1.00 
6    0.90    0.66    0.26  -  1.00   
7      0.97    0.85    0.21  -  1.00 
8    0.94    0.80    0.50    0.17  - 
 
Table 1 illustrates how the asymmetry affect depends on the size of the electorate and the 
relative size of the two income classes in a simple simulation exercise. We assume that all N 
voters have single-peaked preferences and that their ideal points can be ordered as follows: 
self-interested rich (rR*) < inequality-averse rich < self-interested poor (rP*) < inequality-
averse poor. That is, we assume that inequality aversion induces ideal points to shift in the 
direction of more redistribution, but only moderately so. To keep the argument simple, we 
assume that rich and poor voters are equally likely to be inequality averse (the argument can 
easily be extended to different probabilities across classes). In particular, we assume that 
voters are sampled from a population with a share of ρ percent inequality-averse voters. All 
voters are sincere and N  is an odd number. If R  >  P  (RMV), redistribution beyond the 
pocketbook obtains if at least xRMV = ½ (R – P + 1) inequality-averse rich voters are sampled 
into the electorate. If P > R (PMV), this is the case if at least xPMV = ½ (R + P + 1) inequality-
     # poor voters (P) 10 
 
averse poor voters are sampled into the electorate. The main point to note here is that for any 
 and   . Thus, obtaining redistribution 
in excess of the standard prediction is more likely in RMV than in PMV.
5
The probability of observing the pocketbook redistribution outcome, Prob(pocketbook), 
can be calculated using a binomial distribution (in table 1, we assume a share ρ = 0.2 of voters 
are inequality-averse). For example, in an electorate with R = 3 and P = 2, Prob(pocketbook) 
= (1 – ρ)³ = 0.51. In contrast, with R = 2 and P = 3, the probability is 1 – ρ
3 = 0.99, i.e. the 
probability to observe the pocketbook outcome is about twice as large in the case of the poor 
majority. The numbers in table 1 below the main diagonal are for the case R > P. Importantly, 
these numbers are smaller than those above the diagonal for P  > R  which illustrates the 
asymmetry effect. That is, pocketbook redistribution outcomes are generally more likely with 
a poor majority than with a rich majority.  
  
The asymmetry effect is particularly pronounced for “narrow” majorities. For example, 
holding the size of the electorate constant at N = 9, the probabilities to obtain the pocketbook 
outcome are essentially the same for R:P = 8:1 as for R:P = 1:8 (0.94 vs. 0.99) but the 
probabilities are much different for R:P = 5:4 and R:P = 4:5 (0.33 vs. 1.0). For a narrow rich 
majority, inequality aversion matters a lot while for the mirrored case with a poor majority it 
does not (the numbers above the diagonal are close to 1.0).  
The asymmetry effect is particularly pronounced when inequality aversion looms large 
(ρ  is large)  and when the size of the electorate N  increases. For example, if ρ  = 0.3, 
Prob(pocketbook) is 0.34 for RMV (R  = 3, P  = 2) but still 0.97 for PMV. Thus, the 
asymmetry grows from about 2:1 (0.99 vs. 0.51, see table 1) with ρ = 0.2 to about 3:1 with ρ 
= 0.3. The asymmetry is also more pronounced in larger electorates as long as majorities are 
narrow. The asymmetry increases with N. For example, holding the ratio R:P constant at 3:2, 
the probability to obtain a pocketbook outcome is 0.51 with N = 5 but only 0.43 with N = 15 
(not shown in the table).  
 
 
                                                 
5   Note that this statement pertains only to the probability of observing redistribution beyond the pocketbook. 
Additional assumptions on the intensity of inequality aversion would be needed to make precise statements 
about the extent of the deviation from pocketbook voting. For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that 
spite is stronger than generosity which implies that the “poor” deviate by more from their ideal points than the 
rich, if they deviate at all. 11 
 
Payoffs 
Table 2 shows the payoffs used in all 4 treatments by income class and redistribution 
level.
6
Payoffs were chosen to reflect a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Figure 2 shows 
that redistribution decreases efficiency (the sum of the payoffs normalized to the sum of 
maximum payoffs) but increases equality (measured by the payoff of the poor relative to the 
rich). Rich voters maximize their income at low redistribution (rR* = 1), and poor voters at 
intermediate redistribution (rR* = 8).
 The rich have higher maximum payoffs than the poor (200 vs. 92) and have higher 
payoffs at all redistribution levels except for the maximum redistribution level which 
equalizes incomes (payoff of 27 each). Note that payoffs are common information, i.e. all 
voters  are  mutually  aware of the (private and social) tradeoffs involved, and there is no 
uncertainty over one’s (future) income position such that voting does not take place behind a 
“veil of ignorance” (see Cabrales, Nagel and Rodriguez Mora 2007 for an experimental study 
of social insurance). 
7
 
 Assuming pocketbook voting, a poor voter earns only 
about a third of a rich voter (= 60/200) in equilibrium in RMV. The equilibrium ratio of 
payoffs with PMV is more equal. At rP* = 8, the poor earn about 70 percent (= 92/132) of 
what the rich earn. 
Table 2: Payoffs  
Redistribution 
level  










0  194  50  11  114  86 
1  200  60  12  107  80 
2  194  64  13  100  75 
3  187  68  14  92  70 
4  179  72  15  84  64 
5  169  76  16  76  59 
6  159  80  17  68  54 
7  146  86  18  58  47 
8  132  92  19  49  41 
9  128  91  20  41  36 
10  122  89  21  27  27 
                                                 
6   Instructions use  neutral labeling. The “redistribution level” is called “allocation”, and the “rich” and the 
“poor” are called “x-type” and “y-type”, respectively. 
7   Table 2 was part of the written instructions (see appendix A). The payoffs were calculated from a standard 
model à la Meltzer and Richards (1981). See appendix B for details.  12 
 
Inequality aversion may cause redistribution outcomes to deviate from rR* and rP*. For 
example, the poor may be spiteful and willing to sacrifice own payoff to reduce the payoff of 
the rich. However, doing so does not have much bite as can be seen in figure 2. For example, 
inequality is not reduced much by moving from r = 8 to 15 but comes at a hefty cost (about 
1/3) in terms of efficiency. Thus, poor voters need to be strongly averse to inequality
8
 
 to find 
spiteful choices worthwhile. For the rich, generously giving up own payoff to increase payoffs 
of the poor (choices in {2,…,8}) is consistent with high values of β in the model of FS. 
However, redistribution beyond r = 10 implies β > 1, which is ruled out by assumption in the 
model of FS. In short, we do not expect redistribution outcomes above 8 given the inequality 
aversion typically assumed in the fairness model of FS.  
Figure 2:  Trade-off between efficiency and equality (vertical lines show redistribution 
outcomes according to pocketbook voting in RMV and PMV, respectively) 
 
In total, 180 undergraduate students of various majors from the University of Innsbruck 
participated in the experiment as follows: 60 in RMV, 40 in PMV, 40 in RMRD and 40 in 
PMRD. Points earned during the experiment were exchanged at a rate of 200 points for 1 
Euro. A show-up fee of 4 Euro was paid to all participants at the end of the experiment in 
                                                 
8 For example, choosing r = 11 requires α = 1 in the model of Fehr and Schmidt 1999. 13 
 




Section 4.1 shows that redistribution in RMV is biased towards higher redistribution than 
predicted by pocketbook voting, but that  redistribution is almost perfectly in line with 
pocketbook voting in PMV. Thus, we find pronounced asymmetry in how inequality aversion 
affects majority voting on redistribution. Section 4.2 shows that asymmetry is absent in the 
control treatments with a random dictator voting mechanism. Section 4.3 discusses that the 
asymmetry effect may induce insincere voting. We find that insincere voting increases with 
low pivotality according to the asymmetry hypothesis but is not pronounced enough to swamp 
the asymmetry effect. 
 
4.1 The Pocketbook rules with PMV but not with RMV 
Figure 3 shows the main results for majority voting with a rich majority (RMV). We observe 
redistribution outcomes averaged across groups (rm, see dashed line) beyond the pocketbook 
prediction (rR* = 1, solid thin line) already in period 1 (p = 0.003, one-sample Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, WSR), and rm remains at levels close to 4 throughout (average rm is 3.72 
over all periods). The “excessive” redistribution is mainly due to the voting of the rich with an 
average vote of vR = 2.62 (p = 0.012, WSR). In contrast, voting of the poor is quite close to 
rP* = 8 (the average is vP = 8.40 over all periods; p = 0.209, WSR). The fact that rm is closer 
to vR than vP reflects the fact that the rich tend to be pivotal in RMV.
9 The fact that rm > vR 
reflects that the inequality-averse rich tend to be pivotal, i.e. that they drive the redistribution 
outcome in RMV.
10
                                                 
9  Averaged over all periods, the distance to median in redistribution levels is 1.10 for the rich and 4.68 for the 
poor voters (p =  0.005, Wilcoxon matched pairs test, WMP). 
 In summary, the remarkable finding from RMV is that while the poor 
vote quite in line with standard theory, and the rich on average only deviate somewhat on the 
generous side, the average redistribution outcome is considerably more equal than predicted 
by pocketbook voting (index of inequality is 0.39 rather than 0.3 as predicted).  
10  2.62 vs. 3.72, p = 0.002, WMP. 14 
 
















































































Voting is rather heterogeneous across the 12 electorates or groups in RMV. Overall, less 
than half (82/180) of the group-level outcomes are in line with pocketbook voting. While 5 
groups have redistribution outcomes broadly in line with the standard prediction (i.e. deviate 
by 2 or fewer increments from rR* = 1.0), 7 groups are clearly not in line with standard 
predictions. Four of these groups implement intermediate levels of redistribution between 3 
and 5 on average, while 3 groups have redistribution levels that are close to redistribution 
level 8. In one of these groups this is due to all three rich subjects consistently voting for r = 
8, in the other two groups there are two and respectively one subject doing so. In these cases, 
the median voter gives up a payoff of 68 points (= 200-132, see table 1) to increase the 
income of the poor voters by 32 (= 92-60) points each. The choice reduced efficiency only by 
about 6 percent but considerably increased equality (the ratio of incomes of rich to poor falls 
from 3.3 to 1.4). While voting reduces inequality considerably, the resulting secondary 
income distribution is still rather unequal overall. The average payoff in the RMV treatment is 
(excluding the show-up fee) 13.2 Euro (rich) and 5.4 Euro (poor) (p  =  0.000, two-sided 
Mann-Whitney test, MW). 
Figure 4 shows that redistribution outcomes are almost perfectly in line with pocketbook 
voting when the poor are in majority (PMV). Average redistribution is rm = 7.96 (see dashed 
line) which is very close to rP* = 8, and the prediction rP* = 8 is implemented exactly in 95 
percent of the cases (= 114 out of 120 group-level observations). As a result, average total 
payoffs (excluding the show-up fee) are relatively equal in PMV (6.9 Euro for the poor and 
9.9 Euro for the rich
11). The redistribution outcome rm is close to but systematically below the 
graph representing the average vote vP of the poor (see solid black line) in PMV.
12 The fact 
that rm is closer to vP than vR reflects that the poor tend to be the pivotal voters in PMV.
13
The predictive success of standard theory assuming pocketbook voting for aggregate 
outcomes in PMV is striking because its predictions are rather imprecise if not plainly wrong 
for  individual votes. The average vote  of the rich  is clearly  biased away from their 
pocketbook optimum (rR* = 1) throughout all 15 periods (vR = 3.89, p =  0.012 WSR, see bold 
grey line in figure 4). In addition, a considerable share of the poor consistently vote above rP* 
 The 
fact that rm < vP reflects that the inequality-averse poor are unlikely to be pivotal, i.e. tend not 
to drive the redistribution outcome. 
                                                 
11  The difference is nevertheless significant: p = 0.001, MW. 
12  7.96 vs. 8.88, p =  0.019, WMP. 
13  The average (absolute) distances are rm - vR = 4.07 and vP - rm = 0.92 (p =  0.050, WMP). 16 
 
= 8 and the average vote over all periods is vP = 8.88 (p =  0.019 WSR, see bold black line in 
figure 4). While only 53 percent of all voters (18 poor and 3 rich) vote their pocketbook 
interest in at least 2/3 of the periods, the redistribution outcome is almost always (in 95 
percent  of group-level outcomes)  consistent  with standard theory.  Thus,  in line  with  the 
asymmetry hypothesis, we find that – despite many voters supporting redistribution beyond 
the pocketbook – inequality aversion does not matter for aggregate outcomes when the poor 
are in majority.  
 
4.2 Results from random dictator treatments 
We now show that there in fact is no asymmetry in the deviation from pocketbook outcomes 
across class structures when there should be none according to the asymmetry hypothesis. To 
test,  we  run  treatments with an  exogenous  and constant probability to be decisive. 
Importantly, the probability is the same (1/N = 0.2) for all voters in both treatments, i.e. does 
not depend on which class is in majority. We implement two treatments with random dictator 
decision making. Treatment RMRD has a rich majority, and treatment PMRD has a poor 
majority. Note that these treatments are identical to RMV and PMV in all respects except for 
the voting rule. Our main finding is that the deviation from pocketbook outcomes is not 
different across treatments, i.e. is independent of which class is in majority.  
Figures 5 and 6 show the average redistribution choice by income class for random 
dictator voting in  RMRD and PMRD.  Both the poor and the rich make random dictator 
choices slightly above predictions in PMRD (dP = 8.56 vs. rP* = 8, p = 0.030; dR = 1.50 vs. 
rR* = 1, p = 0.030, WSR). In RMRD average choices are not significantly different from 
predictions (poor: 8.40 vs. 8, p = 0.356; rich: 1.28 vs. 1, p =  0.110, WSR).  17 
 


















































































The heavily dashed lines in figures 5 and 6 show the implemented redistribution in the 
two treatments. Implemented redistribution is noisy because one choice is picked at random to 
determine the outcome in these treatments, and the choice may come from a rich or a poor 
voter. Importantly, we find that the deviation of predicted and implemented redistribution is 
not different across treatments. The pocketbook prediction rd* is 5.20 in PMRD and 3.80 in 
RMRD (see dashed horizontal lines). These predictions differ from those in RMV and PMV 
because of a simple composition effect [note that rd* = (R 
. rR* + P 
. rP*) / N)]. Overall 
(weighted) dictator choices are rd = (R 
. dR + P 
. dP) / N. The absolute deviation rd – rd* is 1.14 
in PMRD (6.34 vs. 5.20), and 0.57 in RMRD (4.37 vs. 3.80), and these deviations are not 
significantly different (p = 0.371, MW). In contrast, the deviations from predicted outcomes 
are significant with majority voting. i.e. across RMV and PMV. The deviation rm – rR* is 2.72 
in RMV (3.72 vs. 1) and rP* – rm = -0.04 in PMV (7.96 vs. 8), which is significantly different 
(p = 0.001, MW). In summary, the deviations between predicted and observed redistribution 
outcomes are small (about 0.6) and do not differ across treatments in the random dictator 
procedure, but deviations are large (about 2.8) and significant in the majority voting 
treatments. 
Our finding that the deviation of implemented redistribution from the pocketbook 
prediction does not differ across treatments when pivotality is independent of class structure 
also holds for individual choices. This is true for both rich and poor voters, and for both the 
level and the variance of choices. A comparison of PMRD vs. RMRD reveals that neither rich 
voters (1.50 vs. 1.28, p = 0.419, MW) nor poor voters (8.56 vs. 8.40, p = 0.522, MW) choose 
differently across these treatments on average. The average within-group standard deviation 
for rich voters is 0.74 in PMRD and 0.55 in RMRD (p = 0.957, MW). For the poor voters the 
respective numbers are 0.77 vs. 1.31 (p =  0.394, MW).  
 
4.3 Discussion of results: insincere voting 
The  asymmetry hypothesis claims  that  sincere  voting for redistribution beyond the 
pocketbook by a given share of inequality-averse voters is more or less likely to translate into 
redistribution outcomes beyond pocketbook  interests  depending on how likely inequality-
averse voters are to be pivotal; pivotality, in turn, depends on the relative strength of income 
classes. The discussion above has shown that we find support for the asymmetry hypothesis in 
majority voting in the sense that aggregate redistribution outcomes are much less in line with 19 
 
standard predictions in RMV than in PMV. This holds both with respect to overall average 
redistribution levels and with respect to group-level outcomes. For example, 46 vs. 95 percent 
of group-level outcomes are in line with standard predictions in RMV and PMV, respectively.  
These results are surprising because voters may anticipate and respond to the differential 
pivot probabilities by voting insincerely. For example, rich voters may anticipate that they are 
more likely to be pivotal when they are in majority (in RMV) than when they are not (in 
PMV). Not to vote for the income-maximizing choice is thus less costly in PMV than in 
RMV. Voters may react to these  differences  in expected cost by voting carelessly (thus 
increasing the noise) or by expressing support for what may be seen as a morally worthy 
cause  (thus increasing the bias  towards redistribution beyond the pocketbook prediction). 
Note that incentives for insincere voting are completely absent in the treatments with random 
dictator choice.  
A comparison of voting patterns across RMV and PMV reveals that insincere voting is 
indeed more common for rich voters when they are less likely to be pivotal but the evidence is 
weak for poor voters. For example, among the rich, we find that 57 percent (= 309/540) of 
individual votes are in line with the pocketbook interests (rm* = 1) in RMV but only 32 
percent  (=  76/240)  are  in PMV. The difference is significant  (p  =  0.000,  χ
2  test).  Yet, 
insincere voting among the rich mainly increases noise rather than the average vote.
14 Similar 
results hold for poor voters.
15
Insincere voting may also explain some of the apparent differences in individual choices 
across voting rules. However, the comparison is less sharp in this case. The reason is that 
while we control the pivot probability in the random dictator treatments (it is 0.2), the 
absolute level of that probability is not known in the voting treatments. We do know from the 
asymmetry hypothesis that this probability is higher for rich voters in RMV than PMV. But 
we do not know whether 0.2 is between or, say, below both of these probabilities.
 
16
                                                 
14   In RMV, the average within-group standard deviation of votes among the rich is less than half that of PMV 
(1.06 vs. 2.29, p = 0.021, MW, based on a comparison of 12 and 8 independent group observations in RMV 
and PMV, respectively). But the average vote of the rich is not significantly different between RMV and in 
PMV (2.62 vs. 3.89, p = 0.123, MW). 
 
15  As for the rich, poor voters are more likely to vote insincerely when they are in minority: 51% (= 183/360) 
and 78% (= 281/360) of poor voters vote in line with pocketbook in RMV and PMV, respectively. p =  0.000, 
χ
2 test. While the average within-group standard deviation of votes is higher in RMV than PMV (2.12 vs. 
0.22, p = 0.002, MW), average votes do not differ across the treatments (8.40 vs. 8.88, p = 0.396, MW). 
16   For completeness, we note that for the rich both the average (3.89 vs. 1.50, p = 0.007, MW) and the standard 
deviation (2.29 vs. 0.74, p = 0.027 MW) are different across PMV than PMRD. Neither is the case for the 
poor voters (8.88 vs. 8.56, p = 0.958, MW; 0.77 vs. 0.22, p = 0.388, MW). There are no differences in levels 
or standard deviations for either rich or poor voters when comparing RMV than RMRD. 20 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
A burgeoning  literature has convincingly  shown that concerns for a fair distribution are 
common but little attention has been devoted to how it may affect voting on redistribution. 
Whether fairness concerns matter for redistribution outcomes in majority voting depends on 
whether inequality-averse voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the income class 
structure of the electorate and we show that its effect is asymmetric. Our results support the 
idea that a given amount fairness concerns matter when few fair-minded voters are sufficient 
to tip the balance in majority voting, but does not matter much when many are needed.  
While the asymmetry effect extends to redistribution in electorates with more than two 
income classes in theory, we would like to caution the reader to extrapolate the willingness to 
redistribute beyond the pocketbook observed in our study because the concern for fairness 
manifest in our experiment may not be typical for other samples. For example, Alesina and 
Giuliano (2009) note that different cultures emphasize the relative merits of equality versus 
individualism in different ways, and different historical experiences shape social norms about 
what is acceptable in terms of inequality (for a study of cultural effects on cooperation see 
Herrmann, Gächter and Thöni  2008).  Another  interesting alley for further experimental 
investigation is how fair-minded voting is shaped by the conditions that can be controlled in 
an  experiment. For example, voting for inequality-reducing redistribution may be less 
common when incomes are earned and voters therefore feel entitled to their incomes (Fong 
2001 for survey evidence; for moral property rights in Ultimatum games, see e.g. Gächter and 
Riedl 2005. See Cappelen et al. 2010 for dictator games with production, Esarey et al. 2011 
for voting on redistribution). On the other hand, voting for inequality-reducing redistribution 
may be more common when the trade-off between efficiency and equality is less pronounced 
than in our design because  preferences  for efficient outcomes seem to be common  (e.g. 
Charness and Rabin 2002). Indeed, Durante and Putterman (2009) provide direct evidence 
showing that the support for redistribution decreases with its private and social cost.  
In a broader perspective, our paper adds  to an emerging  literature discussing the 
conditions  when fairness concerns in a heterogeneous population matter for aggregate 
outcomes (e.g. Dufwenberg et al. 2008, Sobel 2009, Schmidt 2010). One way to read our 
results is as a kind of “robustness test” of the standard median voter theory. Our results 
suggest that fairness preferences may matter much or be essentially irrelevant for majority 
voting on redistribution. Which effect prevails depends, according to our analysis, on the 21 
 
structure of income classes which can be reasonably well measured in the field. Thus, we 
believe our experimental finding provides interesting directions for field research. Our results 
suggest that relating  (easily observable) redistribution outcomes to particular  (easily 
observable)  aspects of the structure of income classes  may provide a promising  new 
perspective to investigating the role of (only indirectly observable) fairness preferences in 
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Appendix A: Sample Instructions (translated from German) 
Welcome to the experiment. If you read these instructions carefully and follow the rules you 
can earn money in this experiment. The money will be paid out in cash right after the 
experiment. During the experiment, we denote earnings in points which are converted to Euro 
as follows: 200 points = 1 Euro. 
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the entire experiment. If 
you have a question, please raise your hand and we will answer your question individually. It 
is important that you follow this rule because otherwise the results are worthless to us.  
In this experiment, participants are randomly sorted into groups of 5. This means that you are 
in a group with 4 other participants. The same 5 participants stay in a group throughout the 
entire experiment.  
In your group, there are 2 members of type Y and 3 members of type X. The computer 
randomly determines who is of which type.  
What are the consequences of being type X or type Y? Players of type X have better 
opportunities to earn money in the experiment. 
In this experiment, your task is to decide about the distribution of incomes within your group.  
Specific instructions for the experiment 
You are of type Y. In this experiment, every participant earns an individual income. You 
vote  about  whether and to what extent you would like to redistribute these incomes  by 
choosing an “allocation”. 
The experiment has  15 periods  in total. In each period,  you have to vote  about the 
redistribution of the incomes in your group. The outcome of the vote  in each period 
determines your and the other 4 group members’ payoff. 
 
Redistribution decision  
Table 1 shows the incomes for each allocation. There are 22 possible allocations in total. You 
and the other participants in your group decide about the allocation for your group and thus 
about the distribution of incomes in your group. 
 
[For treatments RMV and PMV] The redistribution decision is made according to the 
following rules: You and the other group members each choose an allocation by typing an 
allocation number into the decision screen that will pop up. The allocation numbers chosen by 
all group members are sorted from low to high. The number in the middle, i.e. the third 
number, in this list is the median allocation. The median allocation determines the incomes of 
all group members in this period (see table 1). 
Example: Suppose you have chosen allocation 12. The other four group members have 
chosen allocations: 11, 2, 17, 5. Sorted from low to high we have:  
1:   2 
2:   5 
3:  11 (= median allocation) 
4:  12 
5:  17 
The median allocation and, thus, the group’s redistribution decision, in this example is 11 
which means that X types earn 114 points and Y types earn 86 points.  25 
 
Suppose you had chosen 8 instead of 12 in the situation above while the others choose as 
before (11, 2, 17, 5). In this case,  your allocation choice is  the third in the sequence. 
Therefore, the median allocation would be 12 and the group’s redistribution decision is 
therefore 12 which means that X types earn 107 points and Y types 8 points. 
 
[For treatments RMRD and PMRD]: The redistribution decision is made according to 
the following rules: You and the other group members each choose an allocation by typing 
an allocation number into the decision screen that will pop up. The computer then randomly 
draws one of these allocations with equal probability (20%). The random draw from the 
choices determines the incomes of the group members in this period (see table 1).  
Example: Suppose you choose allocation 12. The other members of your group choose the 
allocations: 11, 2, 17, 5. The computer draws one of these 5 allocation randomly and all 
allocations are equally likely to be implemented. For example, if allocation 11 is drawn, all 
group members obtain the income shown for allocation 11 in table 1 (114 points for X types 
and 86 points for Y types). 
 
[all treatments] 
Table 1: Incomes for different allocations 
allocation  income of X types  income of Y types 
0  194  50 
1  200  60 
2  194  64 
3  187  68 
4  179  72 
5  169  76 
6  159  80 
7  146  86 
8  132  92 
9  128  91 
10  122  89 
11  114  86 
12  107  80 
13  100  75 
14  92  70 
15  84  64 
16  76  59 
17  68  54 
18  58  47 
19  49  41 
20  41  36 
21  27  27 
 
How you make your decision: In each period, you choose an allocation by typing a fumber 
from 0 to 21 into the decision screen. When all group members have made their decisions, 
the group choice is determined and displayed. At the end of the period you will see the 
following  information on the  outcome  screen:  [You are type …, The group’s allocation 
decision is …, Your income is …, Group members of type X earned …, group members of 
type Y earned …] 
The experiment is about to start. If you have a question please raise your hand. 26 
 
Appendix B: Asymmetry with k > 2 income classes 
Our reasoning adapts the standard model of redistribution by Meltzer and Richard (MR 1981) 
in which voters have single-peaked preferences for redistribution in a single dimension. MR 
has voters with different labor productivities which map into different levels of labor income. 
Voting is on a uniform tax on labor income and per capita redistribution with the effect that 
redistribution reduces inequality. Because workers are assumed to choose  labor supply 
optimally, redistribution is associated with disincentive effects. As a consequence, there is a 
trade-off between equality and efficiency. In MR, voting is compulsory and sincere. Voters 
are self-interested and vote for the level of redistribution that maximizes their post-
redistribution income, correctly anticipating the disincentive effects from equilibrium 
redistribution. As a result, high-income voters vote for low redistribution while low-income 
voters vote for intermediate (rather than maximum) levels of redistribution. In equilibrium, 
the preference of the median voter (which is driven by his labor productivity) determines the 
redistribution outcome. 
In  contrast to MR,  we assume that voters are grouped in income classes (i.e. non-
singleton subsets of voters with identical incomes) and that voters are heterogeneous with 
respect to inequality aversion. Both assumptions are essential for our argument and discussed 
in detail below. We use a reduced-form version of the MR model in that we solve for optimal 
labor supply for given redistribution levels. The payoffs shown in Table 1 can thus be derived 
from a reduced-form MR model
17
(i) Income classes: Assume a continuum of voters with a mass normalized to 1. Each 
voter is a member of income class k = 1,..., q. Each class contains a share of the electorate mk 
(
 assuming an electorate of 5 voters, homogenous classes of 
high-productive (“rich”) and low-productive (“poor”) workers / voters, discrete levels of a flat 
tax with per capita redistribution, and optimal labor supply decisions. The discussion below 
generalizes this case to a continuum of voters and finitely many income classes. 
). Voters choose among a discrete set R = {1,…, l} of redistribution policies. 
For each income class k there is a unique redistribution policy   that maximizes post-
redistribution income and the median policy rmed is implemented for all voters. Voters from a 
poorer class (high k) demand more redistribution:  . We denote by   the 
income of a voter in class k for redistribution policy r and make the following assumptions: 
                                                 
17   MR implies monotonically falling post-redistribution incomes for rich voters. We chose to implement an 
interior maximum at r = 1 for experimental reasons, in particular to allow for the possibility that small 
deviations by self-interested rich voters from their ideal points can be unbiased.  27 
 
A1:  . 
A2:  . 
A3:  . 
A1 states that a voter’s income is maximized at a unique r
* which increases with k. A2 states 
that redistribution is inequality-reducing, i.e. that the difference of incomes between classes 
decreases with r. A3 says that redistribution is non-revolutionary since the ordering of income 
classes is preserved at all levels of redistribution.  
(ii) Inequality aversion: Assume that voters are heterogeneous with respect to inequality 
aversion. A self-interested voter demands   By assumption A3, an inequality-averse voter 
demands more redistribution than an otherwise identical, purely self-interested voter: 
. The further away the ideal policy is from the self-interested optimum, the stronger is 
the voter’s inequality aversion. 
We assume that each voter is inequality averse with some probability and that more 
extreme levels of inequality aversion are less common than moderate levels. Let   denote 
the probability that policy r  is drawn for a voter of class k. The following assumptions 
characterize the voters’ probability distributions over R: 
A4:   
A5:  . 
A6:  . 
A4 rules out that voters prefer inequality, i.e. they are not willing to sacrifice income to make 
the distribution more unequal. A5 says that voters are most likely to be self-interested, and, if 
they are inequality-averse, extreme inequality aversion is less likely than moderate. A6 says 
that voters do not abstain.  
We capture the assumption in MR that higher levels of redistribution are increasingly 
costly with increasing pre-redistribution income (disincentive effects increase with falling k) 
by assuming that rich voters are less likely to prefer a given high-redistribution policy r than 
the poor (high k):  
A7:     
Due to the law of large numbers, a discrete probability distribution over the countable 
set R translates into shares of voters who cast a vote for policy  . Call   28 
 
the mass of voters in class k who vote for policy r, and call   the total 
mass of voters in the society for whom r is drawn. The implemented policy, rmed, is found by 
summation of Mr over classes starting with the richest class ( ) until the median position 
(at 1/2 of the mass of voters) is reached:
18 
 
(iii) Political equilibrium:  Before  characterizing  the political equilibrium with 
inequality-averse voters formally, it is useful to illustrate the intuition. Figure B1 shows a 
distribution of votes over the policy space R with 10 levels of redistribution ( ) and 5 
income classes ( ).
19
Panel 1 illustrates the reference case in which all voters are strictly self-interested and 
cast their votes sincerely according to the pocketbook. In this case, 
 The vertical axis shows the level of redistribution and the horizontal 
axis shows the cumulated mass of voters sorted by income. The richest voters are in class 1 
(far left) followed by the second richest in class 2, etc. In each panel, the length of the 
horizontal lines measures the mass of voters who prefer a particular level of redistribution. 
Thus, a line further up indicates that the voters in this class prefer more redistribution, a 
longer line indicates that there are many voters in this class.  
 is implemented 
(the median position is indicated by the dotted vertical line). Panel 2 illustrates the case where 
about half of the voters in each class is inequality averse to various degrees. Segments of the 
lines are thus shifted upwards in panel 2. The political equilibrium is found by cumulating the 
distribution of the votes. Panel 3 shows that median position intersects this cumulated 
distribution at level  .  Thus, the presence of inequality aversion increases the 
equilibrium redistribution in this example from level 3 to 5. Note that only inequality aversion 
of voters from the median or richer classes matters for the policy outcome.
 20
                                                 
18  We can think of the median vote beating all other r in pair wise majority voting. Formally this requires that 
preferences over R are single-peaked for the realized type of each voter. 
 
19  The number of classes, their sizes, the number of redistribution policies etc. in figure 1 are all arbitrarily 
chosen. 
20  The distribution of votes in the class(es) above kmed does not matter for whether the implemented policy is 
beyond the pocketbook interest of kmed. It may matter, however, for how much the implemented distribution 
deviates from the pocketbook prediction, i.e. how large the deviation of   from   is. 29 
 
Figure B1: Illustration of political equilibrium w/o Inequality-averse voters  
 30 
 
Figure B1 illustrates a case where “sufficiently many” voters from the median and richer 
classes  are  fairness-minded to move the median towards higher levels of redistribution. 
Formally, “sufficiently many” means that at least x  voters from these classes vote for 
redistribution in excess of  . Graphically, x is the distance between the median voter 
position and that of the marginal voter of the median class. Call kmed the class containing the 
median voter and    the materially optimal policy for the voters in the median class. 
Formally,  . If x  is small, a little fairness may suffice to change the 
prediction of the standard model. The larger x, the higher the required share of inequality 
averse voters to change voting outcomes. Generally, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
a fair outcome   is 
   
 
Figure B2: Share of fair voters (z) necessary for fair outcomes as function of x  
 
The required share of fair voters within the median and richer classes to induce an aggregate 
outcome  beyond what  is predicted  by income maximization  can also be written as 
,  see Figure B2. If x  is zero, an arbitrarily small share of sufficiently 
inequality averse voters in classes 1 to kmed is sufficient to induce redistribution beyond the 
standard pocketbook outcome.
21 At x = 0.5, which implies that the median class is also the 
poorest class, a fair voter is pivotal only if at least 50% of the electorate is sufficiently fair-
minded.
22
                                                 
21  “Sufficiently inequality averse” means that a voter prefers redistribution beyond what is materially optimal for 
voters in the median class. 
  
22  Note that x = 0.5 implies that the median class contains at least half of the total voter mass. University of Innsbruck - Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
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